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A Secondary Tool for Demarcation Problem: Logical Fallacies
Tevfik Uyar
Abstract: According to Thagard, the behavior of practitioners of a field may 
also be used for demarcation between science and pseudoscience due to its 
social dimension in addition to the epistemic one. I defended the tendency of 
pseudoscientists to commit fallacies, and the number of fallacies they commit 
can be a secondary tool for demarcation problem and this tool is consistent with 
Thagardian approach. In this paper, I selected the astrology as the case and I 
revealed nine types of logical fallacies frequently committed by astrologers while 
introducing their field and/or defending their claims against the scientific inquiries 
and refutation efforts. I also argued that recognizing these fallacies may help the 
audience to demarcate between the scientific and the pseudoscientific arguments. 
Keywords: Demarcation problem, Philosophy of science, Pseudoscience, 
Astrology, Logical fallacies
Ayrım Problemi İçin İkincil Bir Araç: Safsatalar
Özet: Thagard’a göre sözdebilimlerin epistemolojik boyutunun yanı sıra sosyal 
boyutu da bulunmaktadır ve bilim ve sözdebilim ayrım probleminde bir alanın 
uygulayıcılarının davranışları da bir araç olarak kullanılabilir. Bu makalede 
sözdebilimcilerin mantıksal safsata kullanmaya olan eğilimleri ve safsataya 
başvurma sıklıklarının bilim-sözdebilim ayrımında kullanılabilecek ikincil bir araç 
olduğu savunulmaktadır. Örnek olarak astroloji sözdebilimi seçilmiş ve 
astrologların alanlarını tanıtırken ya da savunurken sıklıkla başvurdukları dokuz 
mantıksal safsataya yer verilmiştir. Ayrıca bu safsataları tanımanın bilimsel ve 
sözdebilimsel argümanları ayırt edebilmede yardımcı olacağı ileri sürülmüştür. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ayrım problemi, Bilim felsefesi, Sözdebilim, Astroloji, 
Mantıksal safsatalar
1. Demarcation Between Science and Pseudoscience
Pseudosciences are a group of beliefs and practices that are often 
mistakenly considered scientific based (“Pseudoscience” 2015), or the 
disciplines that appear to be science but are far from meeting standards of 
science (Horowitz 2005). Despite the pseudosciences are clearly defined in 
the dictionaries and encyclopedias, academia offers no precise definition
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of pseudoscience, nor does it provide an exact definition of science (Schoijet 
2009). There is, however, a consensus on the idea that the pseudosciences 
are disciplines designed to produce valid arguments while steering clear 
of science’s stricter standards (Pavić 2013). In other words, pseudoscience 
is a sort of anti-science, one that not only misrepresents true science but 
also portrays itself as a superior alternative to science (Holton 1992).
Throughout the 20th century, pseudoscience was studied in various 
academic disciplines, by science philosophers such as Popper (2002), Kuhn 
(1970), Lakatos (1977) and others, all of whom viewed the term from an 
epistemological angle. These studies focused on the demarcation problem, 
with a purpose of establishing a genuine definition of science, which 
would emphasize the differences between science and pseudoscience. 
Several differences (meaning the attributes of science that are lacking 
in the pseudosciences) include objectivity, testability, verifiability, 
changeability, reproducibility, cumulativeness, progressiveness, and 
factuality, as well as predictability (Bunge, 2006, 2011; Lakatos, 1977; Lugg, 
1987; Mayo, 1996; Pavić, 2013; Thagard, 1978). Some authors, on the other 
hand, listed characteristics of pseudoscience that are distinct from science, 
such as isolation (meaning isolation from mainstream science and rarely 
participating in academic activities ), misuse of empirical data, a lack of 
cumulative self-correction, pretending to be both traditional and modern, 
and relying on beliefs rather than empirical or testable data (Beyerstein 
1995; Bunge 2011; Gardner 1957). 
There are differences between the pseudoscience and mere 
superstitions, magic and religion. Pseudosciences take the science as a 
model to get benefit from its prestigious position, while others do not 
resemble like science (Boudry, Blancke, and Pigliucci 2014). Like authors 
argued, astronomy serves as the model of astrology. There are more 
examples: Chemistry for alchemy; quantum physics for new age beliefs, 
biology and evidence-based medicine for the alternative superstitious 
medical applications.
There is another approach to pseudosciences, however — one that is 
psychological, or sociological, rather than philosophical. This approach 
focuses on the perceived benefits of the pseudosciences, examining them 
as tools used by the society to fight against the uncertainty of the future. 
These tools are designed to address individuals’ emotional needs, as well 
as to emphasize fraud, using pseudosciences to trade on these emotional 
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needs (Lindeman 1998; Merton 1973; Pratkanis 1995; Shermer 2002).
Some authors have turned their faces to practitioners by the name 
of demarcation. Merton (1973) is one of these authors, and focused on 
scientists’ orientation style in their relationship and communication 
(known as the science ethos), claiming that this style consists of universalism, 
communalism, organized skepticism and disinterestedness, and he claimed 
that a field should be based on this ethos in order to be a science. To 
briefly explain, organized skepticism leads scientists to criticize each 
other’s work; to fix their errors or to improve their results. However, 
there is an organized silence and blindness between pseudoscientists. 
As Thagard’s examination on this issue, pseudoscientists are stagnant, 
turning to resemblance thinking and neglecting to acknowledge empirical 
facts (Thagard 1978; Thagard 1988). His approach is going to be explained 
more in the next pages.
It is worth mentioning that the falsifiability, progressiveness, and 
verifiability are three criteria, which seems agreed most. I am not going to 
discuss the other suggested standards here in the name of demarcation. I 
would like to explain the pseudoscientific position of astrology, which I 
preferred as the case for this essay.
2. Astrology as a Pseudoscience
Astrology is one of the widely known pseudosciences and the objections 
to its scientific pretension do not belong only to the modern era. Isidore 
de Seville was the first scholar who separated astrology from astronomy 
and claimed that astrology was superstitious in his book Etymologies in the 
7th century (Pines, 2015). Although astrology was perceived as another 
natural law — at least until Isaac Newton found out the universal law 
of gravitation (Thorndike 1955) — several Latin and Arabic scholars 
partly objected to the astrology, for either logical or religious reasons. 
Testing the astrological arguments in a modern scientific setting began 
in the 20th century after astrology became a public matter by the help of 
print media, and some astrologers claimed that they could support their 
hypothesis with empirical data. Some scientists felt responsible to refute 
these allegedly confirmed claims and they performed some tests to the 
astrological hypotheses and showed that the assertions are nonsensical 
(e.g. Carlson, 1985; Dean, n.d., 2003; Dean & Kelly, 2003; Mayberry, 1990; 
McGrew & McFall, 1990; Silverman, 1971). 
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On the epistemological side of the matter, most philosophers and 
historians consider the astrology a branch of pseudoscience; however, it is 
difficult to find a consensus on main reasons (Thagard, 1978). According 
to Popper (2002), astrology should be labeled as pseudoscience because 
it does not establish falsifiable assertions. Nevertheless, Popper’s claim is 
not sound because not all the pseudoscientific arguments are unfalsifiable 
(Gardner 1957). Resnik (2000) gives the “The planet Mars causes 
violent behavior” argument as an example from astrology, which is not 
unfalsifiable but simply false. According to Kuhn (1970), the unscientific 
position of astrology comes from the fact that the field is neither failing 
to be falsifiable nor having proponents with failed predictions. Rather, it 
stems from its practitioners, who cannot find the puzzle to solve, which 
interconnects astrology to the “normal sciences” (Mayo, 1996). According 
to Bunge, research field and belief field terms may be used instead of the 
“science” and “pseudoscience” terms, and astrology pertains to the belief 
field for not only its resistance to accept new facts but also for the fact 
that its arguments rely on postulates, which contradict to our knowledge 
from scientific fields, especially biology, genetics, physics, and astronomy 
(Beyerstein, 1995). These postulates are speculative and products of 
imagination. According to Bunge (2011), science does not exclude 
speculation, and it allows practitioners to speculate, too. However, it 
disciplines the imagination of scientists, contrary to astrologers, who put 
no limit on the imagination. According to him, the allowance for unlimited 
imagination makes astrology an art rather than a science.
In fact, all the aforementioned experiments might have been 
performed by astrologers, if they had been interested in verification or 
falsification of their arguments. In other words, if astrology were not 
a pseudoscience, practitioners would reveal curiosity for testing the 
astrological hypotheses and questioning them, if you will. The difference 
stems from the following question: Why do we call the proponents 
astrologers while giving no particular title to the rest or simply call them 
scientists, who are genuinely curious about the truth of astrology? These 
questions lead us to focus on the behaviors of practitioners of a given field 
rather than the fields itself.
3. Thagard’s Practitioner Based Approach 
I am going to locate this article on Thagard’s claims, which suggests that 
because a field does not only comprise the theories and its applications but 
also includes its practitioners, leads us to think it has a social dimension 
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in addition to an epistemic one. Furthermore, Thagard claims that 
demarcation problem approaches should be pseudoscientist-centered who 
are characterized by non-progressiveness, negligence and the ignorance 
of the facts, rather than pseudoscience-centered. He listed the differences 
between science and pseudoscience practitioners comparatively as the 
following five items (1988): 
First, scientists use correlation thinking while pseudoscientists use 
resemblance thinking. Resemblance thinking is a way of thinking based 
on physical or conceptual similarities. For example, when a scientist is 
asked to consider if people with red hair are hot-tempered, he would think 
to take a sample and examine the correlation. However, pseudoscientists’ 
arguments would be based on the connotation of red color, such as 
attributing the meaning of the red color to the blood, war, and aggression. 
It is not a surprise to see them claiming the Mars planet was related to 
these connotations of red color (Thagard 1988). Second, a scientist “seeks 
empirical confirmations and disconfirmations” while a pseudoscientist 
neglects empirical matters. This tendency implies an aversion to testing 
the field’s arguments. Third, a scientist takes the alternative theories into 
account while a pseudoscientist is disinterested in them. Fourth, former 
establishes consistent and noncomplex theories, while pseudoscientists 
usually form elaborate theories, typically based on ad-hoc hypotheses. 
Finally, one can be described as progressiveness, meaning the openness 
of science to the development and regulating the new facts with efforts 
to establish new explanations. Thagard claims that pseudoscientists are 
stagnant in their doctrine, and they do not consider those comparative 
theories are superseding the old ones. Thagard (1978, p. 228) summarizes 
his ideas with the following demarcation criterion: 
A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is 
pseudoscientific if and only if:
1) it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long 
period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but
2) the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop 
the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for 
attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective 
in considering confirmations and disconfirmations.
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Thagard (1988, p. 162) suggests that “in attempting to decide whether a 
field is scientific or pseudoscientific we can take into account, among other 
factors, the behavior of practitioners of the field in empirical matters.” An 
argument such as “If x field whose practitioners use resemblance thinking, 
then x is a pseudoscience” is stronger than the opposite (Thagard 1988, 
p.171). Derksen (1993) agrees with him, by stating that practitioners are to 
blame for all misconceptions, but not the field. 
Thagard (1978) highlights that testability and falsifiability criteria 
are not applicable for astrology because its arguments are vaguely 
testable, falsifiable and verifiable. Therefore, a scientific inquiry is 
possible to the field. So he emphasizes on the development rather 
than the epistemological situation of its arguments. According to him, 
astrology has not revealed any significant progress since Ptolemy despite 
the progress in the astronomy (Thagard, 1978). A serious habit of the 
astrologers is the eagerness for protecting the traditionalist structure of 
the “art”, so astrology is very much outdated, contrary to the knowledge 
of science, which is updated day by day. Bunge (2011) calls this property 
“changeability” which refers to the efforts for enriching and revising 
the knowledge at the hand and he concludes that the evolution of the 
pseudosciences does not depend on research. In fact, Zodiac has been 
shifted since the primary astrological sources were established due to 
the precession of Earth, and the dates of Zodiac signs have already been 
changed. However, there is not any revision made on astrology literature. 
I would like to remind readers that the current categorization of Pluto (not 
defined as a planet anymore) is another example. One can object to this 
example, with claiming the unimportance of artificial categorization of the 
celestial bodies by astronomers, but consistency is necessary for science: 
Several dwarf planets have been discovered in last decades, and yet their 
effects are still not applicable to astrological calculations.
It can be assumed that the practices which are not relying on 
observations –and facts- contain fallacious arguments (Nieminen and 
Mustonen 2014). In other words, when there is not any logical basis for a 
given field or argument, proponents of the field or argument may commit 
logical fallacies, for persuading their audience or as an attempt to refute 
their opponent’s claims. For instance, when Zodiac shift or new dwarf 
planets are reminded to astrologers or the necessity of a measurable and 
observable force that affects the personality of individuals, it is possible 
to get a fallacious response based on nonsense, for the sake of protecting 
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the tradition. Clearly, fallacies are particularly useful to the practitioners 
of a bogus discipline, in order not to lose prestige or audience against the 
factual inquiries. Indeed, the community of pseudoscience practitioners 
may commit numerous fallacies to rescue the failures rather than 
developing theories to solve the problems or contradictions with the 
facts, by showing no concern to evaluate these alternative theories and 
reaffirming with confirmation bias. 
Thus, we can expect astrologers to commit logical fallacies for 
avoiding testability, defending their unsound arguments and ignoring 
the counter evidence. Observation of strong tendency for committing 
fallacious arguments is fulfilling the Thagardian approach because it is a 
perceptible indication of the “…little attempt to develop the theory towards 
solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the 
theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations 
and disconfirmations” (Thagard 1978). Nine of these fallacies are listed in 
the next section.
4. Logical Fallacies Committed by Astrologers
Frequently used informal logical fallacies by astrologers are listed below 
and given with some examples and explanation, including the Thagardian 
attribute they refer. As seen in the examples listed below, some fallacies 
directly relate to the non-progressiveness of the field, or to the resemblance 
thinking style of the astrologers.
4.1. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem argument is used to counter another’s ideas or claims by 
attacking the person, or by pointing out a negative quality to that person, 
rather than addressing the argument itself. According to Walton (1998):
The ad hominem or personal attack argument is frequently the 
immediate defensive response to any new and powerfully upsetting 
argument on a controversial and polarized issue, especially when 
interests are threatened, and emotions are running high on the issue
Consistent with Walton’s claim, it is possible to find an ad hominem 
argument as a counter-argument when contemporary scientists criticize 
the astrology. They usually rely on another fallacy and state that modern 
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scientists are blind, or that their opponents are members of orthodox 
scientific communities, who want to hide the facts. Several ad hominem 
fallacies that are attacking the skeptic scientists, such as, by claiming that 
they are just trying to sell their books or trying to be a celebrity. Following 
explanation is directly quoted from a website owned by Robert Currey, 
trading under “Equinox Astrology” brand operating retail shops in the 
USA, UK, and Australia.
Those at the top of the multi-million dollar “Skeptical Industry” 
make a comfortable living and notoriety through popularizing 
their beliefs. There are lucrative conferences, lecture circuits, books, 
magazines and journals to promote and like an evangelical church, 
donations are encouraged by playing on the fears of the faithful. 
(Currey 2017)
Furthermore, a particular kind of an ad hominem is a circular attack which 
is based on presenting the birth chart of the opponent as an evidence that 
opponent is having bad intents, as Pigliucci and Boudry (2013) stated. In 
such cases, the opponent is accused of harboring a personal prejudice or 
anger toward astrology — as “clearly” foreseen in his own horoscope. 
Another particular kind of this fallacy is common with creationists, 
which is shown by Nieminen and Mustonen (2014), questioning the 
scientific qualification of the opponent. Just identical to the creationists’ 
argument such as “Darwin is not a scientist”, they are accusing the 
skeptics not being a scientist. An equivalent fallacy was committed by a 
Turkish astrologer, for attacking to the author of this paper, who wrote a 
book about the scientific status of astrology as below (Dölen 2015): 
Despite he is an aeronautical engineer and has no information about 
the field [astrology], he is introduced like a scientist … He can only 
be accepted as a science fan who was graduated from university.
Frequent use of ad hominem clearly indicates the oblivious and ignorant 
state of astrologers toward alternative theories or any contradiction to 
their hypothesis by paying attention to the opponent’s himself instead of 
the premises and trying simply undervaluing them. 
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4.2. Appeal to Authority
This fallacy is based on the premise that anything stated by a person of 
authority, or by an expert in a given field, is innately true.
Following example is directly quoted from a popular astrologer 
Binnur Zaimler’s (2012) column with “10 reasons to believe in astrology” 
title, printed in the Hürriyet Newspaper on 2nd December:
Kepler, who distinguished matter and soul, who was a pioneer for 
the end of middle age and the beginning of the Renaissance, was 
a good astrologer … Ali Kuşçu, the chief fortune-telling adviser of 
Fatih Sultan Mehmet [Sultan Mehmed II], was a good mathematician, 
astronomer, and astrologer … Hippocrates, the father of medical 
astrology claimed that each organ is connected with a planet
Simply referring to these historic figures’ interest to astrology is not a 
fallacy. However, Zaimler presents these names as a “reason to believe in 
astrology”, so it is an appeal to authority fallacy, by claiming, “believing 
astrology is good; you must believe in it because they were believing in 
it” implicitly.
In another article, explaining the “esoteric astrology” proposes the 
force of astrology by appealing to authorities like directly quoted below:
Is it possible to talk about an effect coming from skies, in terms of 
present-day science? Not only it is possible but also mentioning a 
human isolated from the universe is equal to refusing the scientific 
findings. It is not a coincidence that Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, 
Galileo and Newton, who were the founders of the contemporary 
astronomy were astrologer at the same time. They were open-
minded scientists and were believing in certain results which they 
obtained from their observations and experiences. None of them 
talked about evidence insufficiency of astrology. (Menemencioğlu 
2017)
In this example, the author uses known scientists to support his argument 
again like the previous one. Additionally, the author tries to argue that the 
denial of the validity of astrology is equal to being narrow-minded and 
being in an anti-science position.
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These names are frequently mentioned while defending astrology. To 
not commit the fallacy of fallacy, it is worth to say most of the mentioned 
middle age scholars were really interested in astrology and using astrology 
in their personal or professional lives. However, they lived before the rise 
of rationalism, and so the demarcation between science and pseudoscience 
was not a hot debate. In fact, astrology was popular through the 17th 
century, not only among intellectuals but also among the public, until it 
was assaulted by the Enlightenment scholars like Swift and Voltaire in the 
18th century (Thagard, 1978). In other words, Kepler and Newton did not 
take astrology into account in a “correlation thinking” setting, as it was 
not a notorious field at the time (Thagard, 1988) and even astrology was 
perceived as another valid natural law (Thorndike 1955).
Institutions may be appealed as an authority sometimes. For example, 
there is a book dedicated for arguing that astrology is a science, which is 
called “Why astrology is a science: Five good reasons” written by Tapan 
Das. In his book, Das (2009) has a title “Noted practitioners of astrology”, 
including the following claims:
During this period, astrology and astronomy went hand in hand. 
There was no bitter distinction between them, as it is today. Medical 
practices also were entwined with astrology. Astrology was taught 
at academic centers along with philosophy, arts, music, architecture, 
and politics. There was little antagonism between astrology and the 
Church at that time; in fact, astrology was practiced by Church
Here, both academy and church are proposed like an authority to support 
the scientific status of astrology. Zaimler (2012) also presents the existence 
of astrology courses at medical faculties until the 16th century, as a reason 
to believe in astrology. Institutional authorities have not to be historic. In 
Turkey, some astrologers claim that astrology has already been accepted as 
a science branch in developed countries and has been taught in universities 
(e.g. Dölen 2014; Ceyhan 2009). Uyar (2016) showed that this claim is not 
true because the mentioned institutions are either not a part of the official 
academic system or formal graduate courses not teaching astrology but 
explaining its effects to the societies in the humanities context as expected 
from a social science program regarding the science and culture history.   
It is worth mentioning other false claim used as a premise for 
authority fallacies, such as Albert Einstein was professedly a proponent of 
astrology. For example, Mann (2004) clearly states that Einstein was one of 
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the great thinkers who was practicing astrology at his book’s preface and 
he presents a quote favoring with astrology which apparently belongs 
to Einstein - but it does not-. Whereas, there is a letter written by Albert 
Einstein in 1943 revealing that Einstein agrees with the pseudoscientific 
position of astrology; and the claimed quote which embellishes a lot of 
astrology books is misattributed to Albert Einstein (Usher 2013). The claim 
is utterly false and there is not any supporting evidence.
The frequent use of this fallacy is related to non-progressiveness of 
the field, due to its purpose to deny progress of the scientific knowledge 
since the 17th century. 
4.3. Appeal to Tradition / Antiquity
This fallacy aims to support a conclusion based on the assumption like 
“something is better or correct simply because it is older, traditional and 
‘always has been done’ ” (Labossiere 2010). 
Astrology is often defended by mentioning it has been survived for 
“thousands and thousands of years” and build on the knowledge which 
has been collected from these “thousands and thousands of years”. In 
other words, it is promoted just by highlighting its antiquity.
I will directly quote from Zaimler’s (2012) “Ten reasons for believing 
in astrology” again. According to her, the following reason may be a 
premise to the “believing in astrology is good” conclusion:
Different astrology approaches which are overlapping one another 
can be found in many culture’s roots. Sumerians built an observatory 
to understand the effects of skies.
I will provide another example from social media. When Metin Uca, who 
is a public figure in Turkey, promoted a book, which criticizes astrology 
by defining it “a charlatanry degrading our minds” 1 in Twitter, one 
proponent of astrology replied to him as follows:
Please research astrology well before insulting such an ancient 
knowledge which enlightened several science branches and has 
persisted for ages.2
¹   Metin Uca, Tweet Post, November 15, 2016, 18:14, https://twitter.com/MetinUca 
²   Cagla Ercanoglu, Tweet Post, November 16, 2016, 23:25, https://twitter.com/caglaercanoglu 
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Some astrologers highlight “ancient” word in a positive meaning while 
promoting it or their products. This effort may influence the book 
names: Astrological Gardening: The Ancient Wisdom for Successful Planting 
& Harvesting by the Stars by Louise Riotte (1989). Earth Mother Astrology: 
Ancient Healing Wisdom by Marcia Starck (1989), Sex, Love, and Dharma: 
Ancient Wisdom for Modern Relationships by Simon Chokoisky (Chokoisky 
2015) are just three examples, which starts to support their content by 
highlighting the antiquity of the field at the book title.
The frequent use of this fallacy is related to the non-progressive 
nature of the field, because of the tendency to stand on the past without 
making an effort to continue researching the discipline. It reinforces the 
notion that the field is nothing more than a stagnant doctrine.
4.4. Biased Sampling & Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc
The biased sample fallacy involves supporting a conclusion with biased 
samples, which are cherry-picked to support the conclusion part of an 
argument, and nothing else.
 
The other fallacy, shortly Post Hoc, named with a Latin phrase 
meaning “After this therefore because of this”. The person commits the 
fallacy by arguing that one event caused another, just because of they are 
sequential.
These two fallacies go with each other when astrologers intend 
to give historical examples for proving the effect of important celestial 
events. Some cases provided below:
Black Death is an infamous example of both biased historical sampling 
and post hoc argument was used to illustrate the powerful effects of a 
triple conjunction. In 1345, a triple conjunction of Jupiter, Saturn, and 
Mars occurred not long before the plague killed millions in Europe, so the 
priests decided that the plague was the result of this triple conjunction. 
Astrologers used this logic as a crutch of sorts, although later conjunctions 
did not correlate with similar dramatic events. This example is a clear 
cherry-picking and the illusory causation only relies on the fact they are 
consecutive.
Another Post Hoc evaluation of history come from Gover (2005), who 
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argues the end of Thirty Years’ War in 1650 and the “breakup of the Turkish 
Empire” in 18213 are the pieces of evidence for the effects of Uranus-
Neptune conjunction (occurs every 171 years), because conjunction leads 
to uncertainty in alleged Neptunian properties, inspirations and delusions; 
and innovation interacts with “fear and illumination”4. Obviously, the 
deterministic relationship between celestial and historical events is fictive 
and supported just because of their chronological order.
There is another example, which connects the birth of notable people 
to the celestial events. Astrologer Demirci is cherry-picking Nostradamus, 
Isaac Newton, John Lennon, Blaise Pascal and Victor Hugo, to support 
her claim that Saturn-Jupiter conjunctions lead to the birth of people 
who influenced the societies (Uyar 2015). Causation and correlation seem 
illusory, due to many more people who have no influence on the societies 
were born on the same days too and many more influential people was 
born on the other days which are not a day of conjunction.
These are plain examples of Post Hoc, originating from lack of a factual 
explanation and a confirmable mechanism to answer why conjunctions 
create such events. Besides, the claimed correlations between conjunctions 
and notable events/people are not only false but also illusory by ignoring 
the negative evidence. These examples are also examples of confirmation 
bias, a reluctance to researching the matter and a tendency to simply make 
an assumption by relying on only the confirmatory pieces of evidence; 
and according with Thagard’s claim about the negligence of all empirical 
materials. 
4.5. Appeal to Faith
This fallacy relies on the claim that if a particular religion agrees with an 
idea, then it must be true.
In Turkey, astrologers continually refer to the Qur’an, the holy book 
of Islam, tacitly claim that since the Qur’an covers and validates the 
astrology, so a Muslim must believe in astrology. There are some books 
³   Gover intends to refer the Ottoman Empire. However, this date is not true for breaking up of 
Ottoman Empire and it is unknown why author claimed that Ottoman Empire had broken 
up in that year.
4  Uyar (2015) showed that Gover’s reasoning relies on an illusory correlation, by presenting 
similar events in the World history in 1640 & 1811 years (ten years before conjunction) and 
1655 & 1826 years (five years after conjunction).
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particularly based on supporting the necessity and validity of astrology 
with religion. 
For example, the main purpose of Ergin’s (2006) book, Astrology in 
Islam, is to provide evidence from Qur’an and Islamic mysticism resources 
to produce the validity of astrology. There is another book with the same 
title for the same purpose authored by Özcimbit & Özcimbit (2011).
On a side note, I would like to mention that this argument is false too. 
According to theologian Davut Ağbal, Qur’an refer to the constellations 
as mere celestial bodies, does not mention anything about their effects 
on people and societies. He also claims the constellations concept in the 
Qur’an is different than astrology (Kılıç 2013).
Correspondingly, the use of this fallacy directly relates to unverifiable, 
faith-based arguments. Moreover, it is also an indication of the fact that the 
astrology discipline is a member of the belief field. Bunge (2011), in turn, 
claims that the pseudosciences are connected to faith, as both are based on 
idealist ontology, idealist epistemology and heteronomous ethics. 
4.6. False Analogy
This fallacy is an inductive argument that consists of utilizing observed 
similarities as a premise to support a conclusion that allegedly shows the 
same similarity.
These fallacious analogies are used for two purposes: First, to fill 
the gap of lacking physical mechanism with an observable alternative. 
For example, a Turkish astrologer claims the following argument on his 
website, under the “Moon at the Health Astrology” title5:
Moon is generally responsible for the tides of our body liquids 
(serum levels, water, blood). Like the rise and fall of oceans at the 
coast, our body liquids rise and fall too in their physical shells…
Similarly, another astrologer Döşer (2014) commits the same fallacious 
argument to explain the influence of the Moon on the people. 
Weather events are atmospheric tides, which are the product of the 
5   “Sağlık Astrolojisinde Ay”, http://astrogufran.com/?p=700
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gravitational force of the Moon. Tidal effect of the Moon influences 
every solid, liquid and gas, even lands are rising with the effect of 
Moon. […] Most effective forces in our Solar System are established 
by the Moon and the Sun, such as tides. Tides are the product of the 
Moon’s elliptical orbit and rotation of the Earth. The Moon affects 
human’s daily life even by this fact. […] The Moon’s gravitation is 
equal to 2.5 times of the Sun and we can understand how much it 
influences our lives. With this effect, people, animals, and plants 
change, and none can stay stable with their thoughts and behaviors. 
Second, this fallacy may be committed for the sake of giving a response to 
“why we should believe in astrology is true”.
The direct quotation below reveals that purpose, by establishing an 
analogy between celestial bodies and people, with an implicit appealing 
to the religion:
While describing human, saying ‘this is a simple animal made of 
meat and bone. It has not got a soul and an eternal life. It changes and 
runs out’ is a product of primitive and narrow-minded approach; it 
is equally primitive and narrow-minded to qualify stars as ‘these 
are simple stars. They are born and they die! They are not alive and 
they are inanimate. They have no purpose, no effect and not affected 
(Bayrakçı 2017)
False analogies are a product of the resemblance thinking style. There is no 
rational basis to establish parallelism between oceans and body liquids or 
celestial bodies and people.
4.7. Etymological Fallacy
This fallacy assumes that the current meaning of a phrase is the same as 
its historical meaning while ignoring all evidence that the language — or 
even the meaning — have since evolved (Bennett 2015).
Because of the “-logy” suffix in the astrology, astrologers frequently 
commit this fallacy, especially in the introductory texts. The influence of 
this suffix on laypeople has already been determined by a field research, 
as subjects rated the word “astrology” as “very scientific” significantly 
more than they did the word “horoscope” (Allum 2011). This result 
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reinforces that when an astrologer commits an etymological fallacy, there 
is a significant chance of success in persuading the target.
Also, another example of etymological fallacy is the word “disaster.” 
Disaster means “bad star” in Latin (dis- means “bad,” while -astro means 
“star”), and the phrase emerged from the belief that disasters happen as the 
result of the positions of celestial bodies (Sagan 2009). This etymological 
root is used to support the negative effects of previously mentioned 
conjunctions.
 
4.8. Appeal to Celebrity or Riches
Appeal to Celebrity and Ad Crumenam (Appeal to Riches) fallacies are based 
on a premise that when a person who is wealthy or famous agrees with 
an idea, then that idea must be correct. This fallacy is not only trying to 
increase the perception regarding the truthiness of astrology but also 
used as a marketing strategy as well. Astrologers often refer to celebrities 
or wealthy business people who purchase astrological consultations. 
Zaimler’s (2012) newspaper article claims that “day by day, the number 
of leaders and businessmen who consult with astrologers increases,” and 
refers to the quote of J. P. Morgan: “Millionaires don’t use astrology, but 
billionaires do”.
4.9. No True Scotsman
No True Scotsman fallacy is another fallacy committed by astrologers when 
bad examples of astrological discourse are reminded to them. This fallacy 
is a counter argument to the refutation of any universal argument which is 
altering the object or subject of the refutation to a specific or excluded area 
instead of revising or conceding the truth (Bennett 2015). When unsound or 
flawed arguments of astrologers are given as examples or any astrological 
hypothesis is refuted, it is possible to face with a counter argument which 
is excluding the relevant astrologer from “true astrology” discipline. To 
be more clear, the fallacy is committed by labeling the another astrologer 
as an ignorant or a charlatan, and accusing her/him of not researching the 
“true astrology” well, without providing any explanation to “what is true 
astrology?” or “who is a true astrologer?” questions.
Because of organized silence, it is difficult to find astrologer articles 
committing “no true astrologer” fallacy in print media, however, it can be 
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found in live TV programs where they have to defend their field against a 
refutation effort or a criticism to his/her colleagues6. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Pseudoscience is an imitation of science, a belief field against a research 
field (Beyerstein, 1995), as well as a form of anti-science (Holton 1992) and 
nothing more than a modern superstition (Adorno 2002). The demarcation 
criteria between pseudoscience and science were discussed from a number 
of different perspectives. One of them suggests that we should focus on 
pseudoscientists rather than pseudoscience (Thagard, 1978, 1988).
 
The lack of critical thinking skills (unintentionally) and reluctance 
to verification and progressiveness (intentionally) lead pseudoscientists 
to commit fallacies, contrary to the scientists who are not expected to 
state spurious claims in fallacy form. In this article, I used Thagard’s 
pseudoscientist-centered demarcation context as the basis, and I suggested 
to use the logical fallacies as an alternative tool. In other words, the fact 
that “true scientists” are not eager to defend their ideas through the 
fallacies when compared to “true believers”, the tendency of practitioners 
to commit fallacies and the frequency of this behavior may be a secondary 
tool for demarcation. 
One might suggest this approach also indicates the non-sciences, 
as their proponents also use fallacies more often than the scientists do. 
However, this is the case for all other criteria. As stated Boudry et al. 
(2014), pseudosciences have a model science to act like it, while others not, 
which draws a clear line between the pseudoscience and the non-science. 
So, it is not necessary to demarcate between non-science and science by 
the tool which I suggested in this paper.
Nieminen and Mustonen (2014) who revealed the fallacies committed 
by creationists against evolutionary theory, suggested that the recognition 
of the fallacies and dismissing them as irrelevant is important especially 
when the audience has some biases. I agree with them and claim that 
being aware of logical fallacies is also useful in distinguishing science.
6  e.g. “Yıldızlar karakterimizi ve gündelik hayatımızı etkiliyor mu?” In Gündem Özel. CNN 
    Türk. August 19, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqBVUSsnARI
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